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Introduction

In Rock Paper Scissors (RPS), three different
”species” compete, but no single species has a
dominating strategy. In evolutionary game theory,
replicator equations model population densities over
time. When a mutation is introduced, they are called
“replicator-mutator” equations. Using the replicatormutator equation in [1] we have shown how
population density of three species change.

❖ Converting to Phase Diagram

Payoff (continued)

When we multiply the Payoff Matrix P given by the
right table entries by the vector x we get the following
fitness functions. We substitute 𝒙𝟑 = 𝟏 − 𝒙𝟏 − 𝒙𝟐 in
order to describe the system in 2 variables:
𝒇𝒙𝟏 = 𝟏 − 𝒙𝟏 − 𝝐 + 𝟐 𝒙𝟐
𝒇𝒙𝟐 = 𝝐 + 𝟐 𝒙𝟏 + 𝝐 + 𝟏

𝒙𝟐 − 𝟏

𝒇𝒙𝟑 = − 𝝐 + 𝟏 𝒙𝟏 + 𝒙𝟐

❖ The Replicator-Mutator Equation for
Global Mutations:

❖ Rock Paper Scissors and the
Payoff Matrix

• The vector x refers to population densities of each
individual element.

X1 (ROCK) X2 (PAPER) X3 (SCISSOR)
X1 (R)

0

-1

1

X2 (P)

1

0

-1

X3 (S)

-1

1

0

Table 1
In order to generalize this model to non zero-sum games,
-1 is replaced with parameter ϵ. This is shown in Table 2.
Table 2 has the zero-sum property if ϵ = 0.

x1

x3
−(𝜖 + 1)

0

1

x2

1

0

−(𝜖 + 1)

x3

−(𝜖 + 1)

1

0

Table 2

0

𝑥1
𝑥2

𝒅𝒙𝟐
= 𝒙𝟐 𝒇𝒙𝟐 − 𝝋 + 𝝁(−𝟐𝒙𝟐 + 𝒙𝟏 + 𝒙𝟑 )
𝒅𝒕

In game theory, a payoff matrix represents all
interactions between two agents. Table 1 represents a
simple zero sum RPS game. Zero sum means that the
matrix follows the zero-sum property where all rows
and columns sum to zero.

x2

𝑋1
=
𝑋2

1

1
2
3
2

• In nature, the common side blotched lizard
demonstrates RPS mating strategies. The realistic
scenario has only the yellow mutating into blue.
Solving a simplified form (for only one mutation) of
the system of differential equations in MATLAB and
then applying the transformation to the resulting
points, we have shown in Figure 3 how the
population densities of the lizards change.

𝒅𝒙𝟏
= 𝒙𝟏 𝒇𝒙𝟏 − 𝝋 + 𝝁(−𝟐𝒙𝟏 + 𝒙𝟐 + 𝒙𝟑 )
𝒅𝒕

[3]

x1

Eliminating 𝒙𝟑 removes the graphical intuition.
The following matrix multiplication using a
transformation matrix. preserves this graphical
intuition. The closer a point on the phase
portrait is to each of the triangle’s vertices, the
higher the population density of that element.

❖Applications in Biology

•

𝒇𝒙𝟏 − 𝝋 refers the relative fitness of an
element’s population aka the Replicator part of the
equation.

Figure 1: Phase Portrait with stable limit cycle.
Conditions where 𝜖 = 4, and µ = .2. All initial
conditions eventually end in a stable limit cycle.

Figure 3: Phase Portrait with stable interior point
when 𝜖 = 0.5 and µ = 0.4 and initial conditions
𝑥1 = 0.5, and 𝑥3 = 0.5.

❖

As seen, the replicator-mutator equation derived from
RPS can serve as a useful tool in obtaining a grasp of
how competing species interact. Additionally, this
equation has relevance to many areas of science
including genetics, theoretical biochemistry, language
evolution and population biology. Like any universal
equation, replicator-mutator equation is an
approximation to reality, but it also grasps many
important features of the dynamics, common to a
wide variety of systems.

o 𝜑 = 𝑥1 (𝑓𝑥1 ) + 𝑥2 (𝑓𝑥2 ) +𝑥3 (𝑓𝑥3 )
this refers to the weighted average of all fitness
functions.

• (−𝟐𝒙𝟏𝒐𝒓𝟐 + 𝒙𝟐𝒐𝒓𝟏 + 𝒙𝟑 ) refers to the change in
the population aka the Mutator part of the equation.

❖
o 𝝁 refers to the rate which the population
changes.

Conclusion

Figure 2: Phase Portrait with stable interior
point. Conditions where 𝜖 = 8, and µ = .6. All
initial conditions converge to
x(1) = 1/3, x(2) =1/3, x(3)=1/3
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